Meloni’s Strategy to Break the Anti-Western Front

A multidimensional interpretation can help interpret the value of Italian activism in the international field, which has had some important appointments since the beginning of 2023. The last one was the trip of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, with Chancellor Antonio Tajani, to India and the Emirates United Arabs. Meloni, in a post on Telegram, defined herself as “very satisfied with the results obtained: Italy is strengthening its relations with India and recovering a strategic link with the United Arab Emirates”. And she added: “Relationships that are important to our foreign policy priorities, which open up many opportunities for our companies and which have a positive impact on important dossiers such as North Africa, Libya and immigration”. Speaking of North Africa, a fundamental step was marked with the visit to Algeria, a few weeks ago. Putting the three destinations together, there is first of all a side that concerns economic relations. Italy implements ties with India after the upheaval over the dispute over the two Maròs and the Augusta Westland case. And it develops them with the United Arab Emirates after the unfortunate Alitalia-Ethiad dossier and the stoppage of arms exports decided by the second Conte government. At the Algerian level, on the other hand, Italy is returning to play a full role in the Mediterranean area. This within the scope of an economic exchange involving multiple assets: from energy to military means, from know-how to prospects for collaborations in the scientific field.

However, there is another dimension that may allow us to attribute another meaning to these visits. And this can be seen in the speeches of Giorgia Meloni and Antonio Tajani during their commitments in India and the Emirates. In fact, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs underlined the request made to the two countries to assume the commitment of the negotiating process (not yet started) of the war in Ukraine. And it’s not a case. In fact, both India and the United Arab Emirates took on an ambiguous position, masked by equidistance, in this year of invasion. The participation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the summit convened last September in Samarkand by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is part of this dynamic. Among the countries that participated, also Russia and Iran. It is true that, when meeting Putin on that occasion, Modi stressed that it is no longer “time for war”, but it is equally true that the photo opportunity of that summit, which brought together the leaders of India, China and Russia, gave the sense the concrete risk of an anti-Western political-economic cooperation, in which Delhi would be a key player. And it is also useful to underline that India, again on February 23, abstained from the UN General Assembly motion condemning the Russian invasion.

A similar scheme can be applied to the UAE. Indeed, a few months ago, President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan met with the head of the Kremlin in St. Petersburg. The sheikh expected a further doubling of the volume of trade between the two countries, after the one already registered in the 2019-2021 biennium. And Algeria? Again, ambiguity. He participated in military exercises organized by Russia in Vostok after the invasion had already begun. He has consistently abstained from voting at the United Nations on the invasion. At the last summit between American and African leaders, he preferred to send a delegate to the White House rather than the presence of leader Tebboune. This complex and dangerous picture, from a geopolitical point of view, makes Italy’s commitment even more strategic: the connection between economic relations and political conviction can break, or at least slow down, the formation of that anti-Western united front in which Putin and the other enemies of freedom and democracy trust.