Ignazio La Russa only told the truth

What did President La Russa say that was so serious that he was accused of attacking the Head of State, putting the institutional balance at risk? Given that the State’s second position should limit incursions into the political arena as much as possible so as not to give rise to the usual exploitations, this time La Russa did not say anything shocking, limiting himself to photographing the reality that has prevailed over the last three decades and to illustrate the text of the Prime Minister’s reform, which in fact does not affect any of the articles relating to the powers of the Quirinale. The opposition, however, stood up above all against the part of the reasoning according to which there is a Material Constitution that gives the President of the Republic greater powers than those originally provided for in the Constitution, and the direct election of the Prime Minister could bring them back to its natural sphere, since it was precisely the weakness of politics that forced the Hill’s tenants to extend their range of action. “Deservedly so” – added the President of the Senate – and on this point it is legitimate to disagree.

There is no doubt, in fact, that during the last Seven Years the accordion of the Quirinale’s powers has expanded so disproportionately that it sometimes constitutes de facto presidentialism. The Mattarella-Draghi interregnum, for example, was very similar to the French semi-presidential model, as Minister Giorgetti courageously observed. From Scalfaro onwards, the role of the President of the Republic was transformed from a simple notary of the parties’ will into an effective dominus of political life, a small revolution well symbolized by Napolitano’s September (just remember the oblique maneuvers that led to Berlusconi’s replacement by Monti in 2011). Mattarella himself, who has always followed the canons of institutional orthodoxy, with the option of conferring the role on Draghi without the knowledge of the parties, placed everyone before a fait accompli by establishing with the prime minister the diarchy well described by constitutionalist Armaroli in his latest works. But the deepest marks of this trend undoubtedly remain those of Scalfaro, who first formally dissolved the so-called Parliament of those under investigation and then maneuvered to oust Berlusconi at the beginning of the following legislature. «In 1994 there was a coup – complained the dismissed prime minister – Scalfaro told Bossi that I was in the ravine and that the judges in Milan would have condemned me for the guarantee notice received at the G8 in Naples and that therefore he should break the alliance with me so as not to end up in it.”

This is how Cavaliere always described the turnaround that led the League to abandon its government and support Lamberto Dini’s coach. Presidential “moral suasion” is considered an added value from an institutional point of view, but on several occasions it has transformed into true “political” interventionism. In this sense, there is a date that remains emblematic: November 8, 2011, when Berlusconi was forced to resign because the state report was approved by the Chamber, but the 308 votes in favor were not considered enough to keep the government alive. , even though an absolute majority was not necessary. This was just the final act of a precise political plan that aimed to undermine the large center-right majority chosen by Italians in 2008. Even then there were clear strengths: informal consultations of parliamentary groups in the Quirinale while the government was in power. full of his functions, the sudden appointment of Monti as senator for life, the continuous discussions between Napolitano and the president of the Chamber (Fini) on very non-institutional and eminently political issues.

Many constitutionalists then praised Colle for having acted in the name of the national interest, with the clear Pavlovian reflection that all means are legitimate when the law needs to be stopped. There is ample literature that demonstrates how much red ink was spilled against Berlusconi, at the tip of the Constitution, and how many specious arguments were used to block any constitutional reform with the bogeyman of a single man in charge. In short, it is a fact that the material Constitution has often turned Colle’s accordion into a grand piano, and the majority would have done better to take note of this, focusing on presidentialism, to bridge the gap with the formal, in instead of entering the dead end of the premiere.

Source: IL Tempo