EU, the year of the vote to decide whether it will have a role or disappear

There comes a time when History, understood as a chain of events decisive for survival, asks you to take them into account. And 2024 will be the Big Test for Europe. One in which the Union will decide its “entry or exit”, the vital step to try to be what it has not been until now, that is, a political entity capable of deciding, influencing, guiding. Until now, in fact, the EU has been the by-product of the great illusion generated by the fall of the Berlin Wall. A collective hallucination of the “end of history” (read carefully the guide of the time, written by the American scholar Francis Fukuyama), in which it seemed that economic integration was enough to move the world. And this integration was represented, in a tangible way, by the single currency. A mirage, precisely, taking into account that subjectivity cannot be created without a Constitution, even more so taking into account the cultural differences between the Hanseatic countries and the Mediterranean countries, to which in 2004 was added the additional difference with the expansion to the East of the countries who left communism just three decades ago. Making three blocks coexist is only possible if we have two pillars: common values, possibly codified – by which we are guided, and which are not mere rhetoric. Strong political leadership. Europe did not have the first, it could only count on the second intermittently and, in any case, never at a central level (certainly there is no epic of the exploits of Jean Claude Junker or, looking at it today, of Ursula von de Leyen).

The consequence of all this was, therefore, a reason for existence based more on norms than on politics. Infringement processes often activated based on technical details, the bizarre rules of the Stability Pact (not reformed in its basic parameters even after the devastating three-year period that has just ended, between Covid and inflation), the obsession green which, driven by the cultural impulse of Northern countries, if it had been fully translated into regulations, would have represented a burden for some production sectors here and there in Europe (read automobiles), as well as for real estate (houses chapter green). On the other hand, however, what is missing is the political perspective. At the request of major political upheavals, the EU has been absent and evanescent. The war in Ukraine, which broke out in its own physical space, saw no credible negotiating activity from Brussels for almost two years. Furthermore, prefiguring a paradox: for a long time the negotiation work was carried out by Erdogan, an Islamic dictator who holds in his hands the fate of Peace in the territory of secular Europe, the cradle of democracy. In the context of the Middle East crisis, the diplomatic dynamics can be summarized above all in the dialogue between the President of the United States Joe Biden and the Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Furthermore, more than once the sad spectacle of a misalignment between the Commission and the Council has come from Brussels. This was, in fact, one of the critical points of this five-year period. The dualism between Ursula Von der Leyen (president of the European Executive) and Charles Michel (number one of the body that brings together the Heads of State and Government) provided the desolate image of a Europe divided within its government. It is not exactly the best political deterrent for opposing powers that are betting on a divided Europe, first at the institutional and dialectical level of national states, then public opinions. China, Russia (whose political influence and economic investment activities are very fervent, for example in Hungary). And again Iran and the centers of Islamic fundamentalism, which unfortunately returned to a new phase of activism.

Challenges cannot be faced without politics. One above all, that of illegal immigration, which had a first result with the agreement reached recently (which overshadows the redistribution scheme between member countries that never came into force), but which will also require important cooperation work with countries of departure. as third countries. And then there is the challenge of enlargement: the possibility of the entry of Ukraine, as well as the Balkan countries, is now an obligatory route. To understand why, just consider Russia’s activism in Serbia, where Gazprom and Sberbank support economic, religious and cultural groups favorable to Serbian and pro-Russian ultranationalism. In addition to links in the area of ​​military trade, with the sale of drones, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft defenses by Moscow. However, democratic solidity, both in the Balkans and in Ukraine, presents differences compared to European construction. Finally, the American challenge. The polarization of American society, as the White House elections approach, could lead to a disengagement from the United States in several scenarios (the most immediate seems to be the provision of aid to Kiev) with the risk of a ” Afghanistan”. An EU trapped in endless internal derbies would be crushed by the facts. The construction of the next majority in the European Parliament and the subsequent designation of the Community Executive will have to take all this into account when all EU countries vote next June.

Source: IL Tempo

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