On May 23, the governor’s 16-member group signed a document calling for the establishment of a “federal court” that would significantly expand the existing one. They propose to create a “federal” 25-member court to transform the court into a “more modern” institution, based on “more effective” and “best international experience” (sic). An initiative that is politically motivated by Kirchnerism takes the suggestion of a lawyer (in my opinion careless and improvised). Raul Zafaron. The ruling was presented by the ruling party senator as the “only means” of the long-awaited expansion of the court.

Of course, the substance of the reform (one way or another) depends on the most appropriate political strategy to approve it (“Let’s increase the number of judges to 25 so that all provinces can be rewarded”) is already a huge problem (we are talking about fundamental rights and not the powerful Between businesses). However, I am not going to deal with this objection in the future, nor will I focus my criticism on issues of political coherence and intellectual honesty (although the serious problem is the one who is calling for an increase in the number of judges today. Below I will focus on a long series of legal objections that allow us to view the Federal Court’s initiative as unreasonable or ridiculous.

First of all, I would like to point out that the alternative, as it has been identified, shifts to a legal body, to a serious political problem, such as that which concerned the “old” Senate of the 1853 Constitution (and which forced. Senate Reform, 1994). The point was that the Senate of the “1853 Version” could not protect the “minorities” of each province. The “old” Senate was usually the majority group in each province, and at worst it was the pure expression of the provincial oligarchies. That’s why the 94-year-old reform forced the inclusion of a minority senator.

That said, it makes the second problem visible, much more serious than the one mentioned. The fact that The court is not and should not be a “representative” body, especially a body designed to represent the voice of provincial governors. On the contrary: the court should ensure the special protection of the most vulnerable minorities. His task is not (by any means!) To become a representative of the local government (powers that, moreover, most often threaten the rights of those who dare to challenge them, for example, the last and horrible case of the prosecutor.

The third problem will be next. Unlike Congress (Argentina or North America), which took it as a “rift” or major conflict to resolve the provincial integration conflict in the nation, the Supreme Courts have always focused on resolving other types of conflicts. They applied prevention “Violation of rights”, Than to follow “Territorial interests”. Guarantees of rights (such as human rights) primarily require thinking about individual freedoms and state obligations: States (nations and provinces) are the ones who have to submit to control, instead of deciding which control has the right control over their decisions.

Now, does the current constitutional model help our judges to protect the rights of minorities? Partly yes and partly no. It is true that our constitutional system makes some “effort” to “motivate” judges to protect the rights of minorities. So, for example, when it “separates” the judiciary from the rule of the majority (supreme judges are not elected or dismissed by citizens); Or when certain special studies are required for a judge; Or when the court grants positions with high stability (so as to “isolate” them from conjunctural “social harassment”); Or when it creates special conditions for decision-making (judges are not usually required to make decisions under time pressure). However, it is also true that such “attempts” were limited and imperfect. Our system would rather serve to separate judges from the “majority” than to encourage them to protect the most neglected “minorities.” That is why we are talking about a “democratic” problem that affects the functioning of the judiciary throughout America. However, and on the issue that concerns us here, it is important to note that a proposal such as that of the Federal Court will not only leave the “democratic” problem unresolved (as it will continue to be an elite: five, 15 or 25 members, which The court resolves our most important constitutional disputes from the “altar”), but at the same time insults, in the most and most irresponsible way, the observance of the constitutional obligation. The rights of all minorities and especially those who dare to question the authority of provincial leaders.