Eleven months after the start of the Russian war in Ukraine, Europe and the United States cross another red line and send their battle tanks to Kiev. Germany will send Leopards, the Americans will send Abrams. “Finally”: This is the reaction of those who say they believe the tanks will change the balance of the war and determine the decisive victory of the Ukrainian forces. In fact, the passage is historical in its own way, although it has been talked about for a while. Since the end of autumn, the situation at the front has become complicated, at least for the Ukrainian army, and Western ministries had to take this into account. In the summer it was said that the Russian army was about to disintegrate, then things turned out differently and the main concern was a Russian counterattack. That’s why the insistence on cars.

Berlin agreed to send first the Marders, defense tanks, and then, after a long discussion with the United States, the Leopards as battle tanks. In the Bundestag yesterday, Olaf Scholz reiterated that the war has a “political” administration. We react cautiously and, above all, in harmony with the allies, according to the needs on the ground and the development of military operations: at the first stage, anti-aircraft defenses were needed, then it was necessary to focus on drones. attacks, then support artillery for the liberation of territories. All this before they become warring forces, that is, without going directly into battle. Not even now with the dispatch of leopards.

That’s why the Germans were inflexible at Ramstein on January 20, and the change to the top of the defense ministry has little to do with it. The decision to send tanks must be collective: Berlin and Washington are equally involved in the operations, and therefore together they support Ukraine and together they will try to define peace. This is the point Scholz needs to make clear: Europe cannot agree to be Ukraine’s mere military repository, leaving the diplomatic initiative to the Americans. As such, Scholz achieved a minor diplomatic masterpiece: news about Washington not sending the Leopards, but Washington’s involvement. Far from fearing or worrying about the German past: the Chancellor has announced the turning point announced on February 27, zeitenwende and Europe (for the time being) with the Eastern countries, which understandably want a more determined stance, and give it an international dimension. A fact that also dampened the British decision to go it alone: ​​more of a pro-Brexit ad than real help to Ukraine, because the problem was not the absence of Germany but the international framework in which all the players found themselves. Will it be enough? Or rather: will the leopards really be the turning point of the war?

Military experts are divided here. According to some, yes: confronted with western tanks, the Russian army will enter the crisis. Still, if that’s true, the Leopards will take months to become operational, while the Abrams will take a little less than a year. Need time to continue to pressure Putin and force him into a deal? Maybe. However, it may not prove to be a decisive move, at least in the near term. So much so that once we’re done with the discussion about the tanks (as expected, there will be Leopard-type ones to be sent as well), the air force discussion opens up. The news has been circulating for weeks, and yesterday the former ambassador of Ukraine in Berlin, Andriy Melnyk, openly said that the F-16 and F-35 are needed. A demand that could open a new polemical front in the West, as well as signaling that the challenges on the field are more serious than said. Also at the Bundestag yesterday, Scholz hastily drew a new red line underlining that there was no mention of airplanes. The question is: how long will it be respected?

Because here is the real, inevitable limitation of Scholz’s strategy, if the reaction to the situation on the ground, if the support for Ukraine is functional for the development of the situation, then there are no real red lines. There is at least one method, which is to agree on every decision with the Allies, which means preventing anyone from going their own way, even between European Union countries. And above all, some attempts by individual states can cause irreparable damage. But there doesn’t seem to be a strategy beyond that. German politics is certainly and understandably cautious, limiting itself to being reactive, but for now it seems incapable of thinking of a target and following it. Too “passive” policy.

It is likely that the federal chancellor is preparing for a necessarily covert and off-camera diplomatic activity, after Europe and the United States have shown that they are determined and united in continuing to support Ukraine. Such a phase can only take place in absolute secrecy while the war is actually going on. Waiting. Because otherwise, in the coming weeks, as we enter the second year of the war, we may come dangerously close to a new phase more devastating than the first.