In our last video with Ivan Grieco, after a, I think, constructive, professional and respectful discussion, my friend and senior general from the Academy, Paolo Capitini, addressed me to respond to my observations of the current problems of the Russian Army. the question of fate: “But in short: if the Russians are in such bad shape, how come the Ukrainians have not won yet?”. I remember writing a post before to answer this question, but I realize we need to get back to it: Not much to answer to Paolo, a professional whose question is obviously of rhetorical value in the context of a technical discussion. but to dispel the doubts of the majority of the public, they, too, give this question a superficial value.

Actually, the question is quite understandable and I think a lot of people are asking it; therefore it deserves a clear and detailed answer. The cognitive problem of our society is that we live in an increasingly digital world, where we are used to always being answered in more or less precise numbers and in clear statements that tend to simplify questions that are not really simple at all. We’ve lost the habit of approaching problems in an analogical way and have basically become a bit Manichean in the sense that we always want a hard answer: yes or no, black or white.

Will the West continue to support Ukraine? Yes or no?

Will the war end within the year? Yes or no?

Will Crimea be liberated? Yes or no?

Will the counterattack be successful? Yes or no?

Yes? So why are they still even ten kilometers from their starting location?

Unfortunately, the answer is a calming “complex…”, at which point skeptics often start laughing.

Remember: skepticism is healthy. But this should only be the beginning, not the result of reasoning. Sources should be questioned and verified; the same applies to theories built on the data provided by these sources. But doubt should be a tool for analysis; Turning doubt into a shield behind which to showcase the wisdom of the sports bar to the bitter end is not an end in itself as it seems to many.

Let’s start at the beginning: What distinguishes an intelligence analyst from other analysts? Continuous re-evaluation of resources.

Economic analysis is a starting example; As I am outside my field of experience, many experts in this field will of course correct me, but I find the issue of the assessment of the state of the Russian economy by highly skilled institutions illuminating. These institutions operate in a standardized manner, on the basis of unified procedures based on baseline data that are considered reliable: to have statistical value, these data must be compatible and therefore always estimated in the same way, starting from the same sources. In a particular case, these sources are official Russian sources.

It now seems clear to me as an intelligence analyst that, precisely when the purpose of the analysis is to verify the effect of Western sanctions against the Russian economy, the data officially provided by Russia itself will not be very reliable, regardless of whether they are located in Russia. past (before the war); However, many economic analysts seem to have neglected this point, as the potential uncertainty of the value of ordinary resources exceeds their competence. As a result, we’ve been told for months (and in some cases still) that Russia’s economic data is good and that’s why sanctions aren’t working… In hydrocarbon exports, planes have been grounded due to a lack of spare parts, regardless of the collapse in the value of the ruble.

The military analyst draws from his own combined professional experience (he is not an analyst if he does not have this experience), which provides the basis for establishing a starting point from which to analyze the developments of a conflict: It is a question of a thorough understanding of the military potential of the adversaries and the aims arising from the conflict. The second step is to establish a method of comparative confrontation between opposing forces, based on historical precedents from previous professional experience.

The third step is to find the sources… And the analyst, who is no longer on duty here, is forced to use Open Sources (OSINT – Open Source Intelligence) as he no longer has access to secret sources.

Once found, sources should be classified: not only on the basis of reliability, but also on the basis of expertise. There are OSINT sources that are in some ways reliable and in others unreliable; There are even people whose credibility is obviously second-rate. There are those that apply at the strategic and non-tactical level and vice versa. credible relative to “friendly” forces, not “enemy” forces (again: the military analyst is almost never “neutral”: he is aligned with his “own” side, to which he is normally bound by an oath; the objectivity of your analysis is a professional aspect completely unrelated to impartiality) and quite the opposite. In short: It takes time and patience to evaluate them and select them according to their intended use.

After the sources are classified, the news they produce should be evaluated. A reliable source can sometimes give false information and vice versa; when this happens you have to reclassify the resource. The news provided may seem more or less credible based on the picture that has already emerged: a source’s high ranking is apparently not enough to make non-photo news stories credible. Deepening will lead to a re-evaluation of the source or a change of framework; both are indigestible for the analyst, but are things that need to be done from time to time. Once the picture of the situation has been outlined, the analyst can finally begin his real work: dynamically “reading” the current situation, predicting its future development based on historical and/or doctrinal schemas he has acquired through his professional experience. experience.

Basically, future “scenarios” are created that can be compared with the hypotheses of experimental studies in the scientific field, and clues are sought among the current news stories that can confirm or reject any possible interesting scenario. For example: Does the attacker pointing to an impossible river have enough bridge material to cross the river or not? If so, we’re dealing with a primary effort, otherwise it’s just a secondary effort that will stop at the river itself.

Over time, the number of plausible scenarios is greatly reduced, and generally three references are retained: the most favorable, the most dangerous, and the most likely (this is usually the average of the other two). The more the three scenarios overlap, the closer the analyst is to making a reasonable guess of what might happen in the future.

In summary, this is how the military analysis of the intelligence specialist works. Let us now return to the initial question: How is it possible for the Russian military, whose situation many military analysts have described as critical, still resist such brutal resistance? Based on the previous analysis of the 18-month war, it is clear that the Russian Army has suffered an irreparable deterioration. The professional army, which originally existed with a large offensive component of its vast military potential, is now largely absent and has been replaced by an additional mobilization potential, which is quantitatively superior to those hitherto lost, but much lower qualitatively.

On the other hand, the conscription army of Ukraine carried out its mobilization in order to cover the losses and at the same time expand its military potential without deteriorating qualitatively; on the contrary, increased Western support resulted in a slow but steady improvement in its quality, thus increasing its offensive component.

Thus, the initiative passed from the Russians to the Ukrainians, due to the qualitative superiority of the latter over the former: it is now an irreversible superiority, thus making it impossible for the Russians to “win”.

But at the same time, Ukraine’s ability to “win” is still limited due to the reduced offensive component, which should affect the overall potential of the Russians, which, although qualitatively lacking, is still quantitatively superior. However, the capabilities of the Russians are extremely variable depending on the components: the degradation suffered by the army is in fact generally catastrophic, but asymmetrical to the various services due to the nature of the conflicts that have occurred so far. The infantry, and above all the tank crews, suffered more than 70% casualties and were replaced by mobilized soldiers who lacked the necessary skills; but the gunners are only now being joined by the counterbattery and their losses are much less so that shooting where maneuvering is no longer present is still professional. The same goes for engineering and electronic warfare, where casualties of original professional personnel are minimal: so their effectiveness in the field is unaffected, which shows. In short: the Russian army is too regressed to recover in a short time; however, their remaining capabilities are sufficient to constitute a solid barrier to Ukraine’s still limited offensive capabilities.

This is the reason for the slow progress of a counter-attack, unmatched in history in terms of its technical and tactical characteristics.