How dangerous is the situation in the Middle East and what does this have to do with the war in Ukraine? Let’s start with the facts. The first fact is of a formal nature: it is necessary to define the working environment we are talking about. While the conflict in Ukraine has the characteristics of a symmetrical, conventional, all-out war of high intensity between two equal actors (even if one has a nuclear arsenal and the other does not), the conflict in the Middle East is quite complex. It has the characteristics of an asymmetrical, rebellious, widespread conflict of high temporary intensity between two completely different actors, one with state characteristics, the other with terrorist characteristics but popular support.

Moreover, the first situation pits infinitely larger populations and regional masses than the second and consumes infinitely more economic, material and, above all, human resources than the second, regardless of the level of media exposure.

To make a football comparison, it is as if we are comparing Germany-Brazil in the World Cup with Belgium-Cameroon: perhaps the latter may be more exciting and better played, but the former will have a much greater impact on football. final result of the championship.

Then, looking at the facts on the ground, Hamas attacked in cold blood, faced a strategic surprise, and Israel was caught “with its pants down,” so to speak. Moreover, the attack was very well executed, based on accurate intelligence preparation and impeccable planning; It achieved most of its intended objectives, and it certainly achieved its intended purpose: to unleash Israel’s desire for massive retaliation.

Facts bring with them evaluations and questions. Why was Israel, known for its excellent military intelligence, caught off guard? I think a special investigation commission, which will have access to much more data than me, will intervene at this point. But from the outside I can say that this has to do with the priorities that the current government gives to the security forces… I do not intend to interfere in the internal political problems of a friendly country, it is not my job – but I do not know that the current government (moreover, it is completely legitimate) for the entire Israeli society and therefore for its own security forces personnel It is no secret that it is extremely divisive, and this may have contributed to communication problems. between various levels and their entities.

The professionals’ basic assessment is that Hamas’s planning and intelligence preparation were so good as to raise doubt beyond legitimate doubt as to whether these were the specific consequence of its removal. After all, never before has a military operation penetrated so deeply into Israeli territory and caused such widespread damage throughout the region, with armed elements roaming the streets of Israel. There is a lot of talk about Iranian intervention, but aside from the fact that I have serious doubts about Iran’s suitability to carry out a similar action at this time, I also have even more doubts about the ability of the Iranian side to carry out such a good action. structured professional support.

But the question that fascinates me the most is another: Why didn’t Hezbollah attack at the same time as Hamas or immediately afterward to maximize the surprise factor? The opportunity to bring the war to Israeli soil for the first time, if only for a few hours, was unique and unlikely to be repeated. In fact, once Israel takes action, the probability of Hezbollah carrying out offensive operations (other than simple rocket launches or terrorist acts) drops to zero. The window of opportunity opened for asymmetric organizations to attack enemy territory continues as long as the conventional enemy is under the influence of surprise and does not gather its forces, and this window has now largely closed.

Once we have identified and determined the points to be discussed, let’s move on to the analysis. Hamas’s attack occurred in perfect synchronicity and again unexpectedly with the Russian side’s attack on Adviika, regardless of domestic motivations such as preventing Saudi-Israeli rapprochement.

Given that, as noted, Hamas’s planning leaves room for suspicion of highly professional support from much more capable state institutions than Iran, and that this support could easily include satellite imagery support, suspicion arises that Hamas’ action was both supported and coordinated. high with Russia. Among other things, this is in line with the Moscow Regime’s strategy of increasing international tensions to divert both Western attention and support away from Ukraine.

This is to always remember that Putin’s style of reasoning is completely different from ours, and many of his attempts reported to us seem not only wrong but also absurd: saying “it is not suitable for Russia” is no way to refute this claim. A suspicion that, if confirmed, would explain many things. Russia is working closely with Iran, so it is highly likely that the Tehran regime was involved in the preparations for the action… The preparations probably took quite a long time.

But if Iran was involved in the planning and Iran largely controls Hezbollah, why didn’t it use the window of opportunity to join the attack? Let us remember that both Hamas and Hezbollah are fundamentalist (though not jihadist) organizations and are committed to self-sacrifice: the opportunity for glorious martyrdom is never ignored, and their own losses are considered less important than those of the Russians…

There are many differences between Hamas and Hezbollah. Both entities are fundamentalist, but one is Sunni, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and openly backed by Qatar (and less openly by Erdogan’s Turkey), while the other is Shiite and backed by Iran as well as Assad’s Syrian government. It depends on . In Syria itself, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood are irreducible enemies who have been fighting for years alongside and against the Russian-backed Assad regime…

And this may explain the apparent lack of coordination between two fundamentalist organizations, bound together by hatred of Israel and support from Moscow, but separated by a mutual sectarian hatred equal to Zionism. An asymmetric aggression like Hamas’s has a clear-cut purpose: to violently provoke the enemy into a disproportionate response, causing macroscopic collateral damage that can lead to lethal political and diplomatic damage; In this particular case, the kind of damage that would block the Arab-Israeli negotiation process and further divide public opinion in the West. The cost of such an operation, in addition to the collateral damage already mentioned (destruction of infrastructure and massacre of civilians), also includes the destruction of the organization’s military apparatus. All these costs seem completely unreasonable to us, but they seem perfectly appropriate for a fundamentalist terrorist organization that values ​​its own and others’ martyrdom.

This price, which is absolutely worth the candle for Hamas, may not be worth it for Iran, especially now: the destruction of Hezbollah would deprive Tehran of a valuable and long-developed tool of pressure, and would bring with it the remnants of the Assad Regime and its influence on Iraq, Russia Just as Iran has completely lost its conventional military projection capacity, it also leaves Iran alone in the Middle East.

But if this were the case, obviously why would Iran have participated in the planning of this operation? As mentioned, planning must have been a long process that probably began before the conflict in Ukraine; It probably did not stipulate an exact date for the start of operations and was, as they say, “contingency” planning that had to be implemented at the right time. This moment had obviously come for Hamas and Russia, but not for Iran.

What has changed in the theater recently that has caused the interests of Moscow and Tehran to diverge? There was renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, with Russia’s forced but humiliating withdrawal from Armenia and the rise of Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey and, above all, Israel: an Azerbaijan in a particularly dangerous strategic position for Iran. It is a country that has every interest in cooperating with the West in the event of a direct conflict with Israel and when it creates the West’s only access route to Central Asia, which is suddenly free of Russian tutelage and anxious to escape Chinese intervention.

Due to its current massive internal problems, Iran is absolutely not ready for a direct conflict with Israel; because Russia has clearly demonstrated its inability to support its allies. If the proposed scenario is true, we would face a crack in the alliance between Russia and Iran; Iran is dragged into a conflict from which it cannot escape due to its own anti-Israeli rhetoric, but Iran is literally being held by the hair. He was definitely not ready to face it right now.

We will see in the coming days whether the practical attitude of the ayatollahs will confirm this scenario with less aggressive behavior than expected…

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