There has been almost no mention of the war in Ukraine since Hamas attacked Israel. Aside from the alarming myopia of the international media, which now focuses on the impact of the news rather than its actual size, this is also due to, and is due to, the reduced flow of information in general. It caused operations on the Ukrainian side to slow down.

However, at this point it is necessary to update the situation, because the war in Ukraine is not over yet and the situation is certainly not frozen.

Counter attack to destroy the Russian army

Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which I will never tire of repeating, was directed not at the “region” but at the “enemy”, and therefore its goal was not a specific topographic relief, but the destruction of the enemy’s military potential. The result of piercing the large Russian defensive belt south of Robotyne led to the Russians entering the war on the main strategic reserves: in the last post we saw how this led to a real “encounter war” between the best of the Ukrainian masses. A maneuver deployed into the breach to widen it, and the best of the Russian strategic reserve was sent into the same breach to close it again. The outcome of this conflict may range from closing the breach to turning it into a real breakthrough.

Ultimately, the result was a stalemate for now: the Russians failed to close the breach, and the Ukrainians failed to widen it.

The Russian offensive at Avdiivka, although so far with disastrous results, has achieved the repositioning of much of the Ukrainian general support artillery (in the name of the famous “inner lines”) supporting the advance on Robotyne. The Russian advance on Avdiivka also eliminated the Ukrainian bite to the south; The arrival of the rains slowed everything down even more.

In addition to these specific factors, there may be another factor that I can only assume, but that would certainly make sense… Which brings us back to the eternal hidden factor that logistics support represents.

The latter, as already mentioned, is the only element of military art that has its own strictly quantitative dimension, which dominates the qualitative and “human” dimension (no matter how much effort people put into this: a ton of material will always remain a ton): this means that It means it needs to be calculated and planned well in advance. Logistical calculations must be made the further in advance, especially during planned attacks, the greater the expected consumption… Therefore, the calculation (and planning of the dispatch) of the resources required for the summer counter-offensive must be made. was taken out by the Ukrainians in the spring. And this may not be as true as one would like.

In particular, one of the advantages discovered by the Ukrainians in opening the breach in Robotyne was the ability to rotate forces added to the main effort, something the Russians could not do: this way the Russians were worn out much faster. and suffered greater losses, which fulfilled the main purpose of Ukraine’s maneuver against the “enemy”.

But now, at the stages of the encounter war, this ability of the Ukrainian side failed, and as a result, the forces used at the very critical moment were further worn out. This fact, combined with the need to redirect general artillery support to the unexpected Avdiivka front at the very beginning of the autumn rains, “closed” the action at Robotyne and caused the counter-attack to “climax”.

In short: this phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive—if we want to call it the “summer offensive”—is over.

The current result is certainly doubtful: territorial gains were minimal (I keep repeating that this was not the goal, but people want to see long arrows on maps and the names of liberated places), but the casualty rate – especially considering the Ukrainians were acting aggressively and therefore probably more they have had to suffer much – certainly a positive, and while the broad Russian defensive belt is significantly worn down, as are the Russian forces defending it, Ukrainian forces do not appear to have been significantly damaged beyond fatigue.

In particular, it seems that material losses (which can be calculated with georeferenced ORYX data) are certainly satisfactory, while human losses are increasingly difficult to calculate, but at the same time, given that from June to 2015, they seem to favor the Ukrainians, at least in qualitative terms. In October, the Russians lost forces that counterattacked first of all and corresponded to mobile units that were qualitatively superior to those tasked with defending the trenches.

However, the fact remains that the counter-offensive has stopped at this point, at least for now, and the Russians have regained the initiative with the Avdiivka attack. At this point, two questions arise: Will Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the South continue, and how will Russia’s offensive in Avdiivka proceed?

Robotyne’s Breach

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the South has come to a head not because it was directly stopped by the opposing forces, but because of logistical fatigue and the need to divert fire to another point on the front, so the conditions for resumption are fully present. The original Russian defensive line has been eroded and breached at one point, and it will remain to be seen whether the Russians can repair it further back: there is not much room to do this and personnel (sapers) are required to operate. ) and, above all, the availability of materials (mines) whose availability is questionable and the logistical support required to do this is unstable (the Ukrainian artillery has further expanded its arm with the ATACMS and the communication routes of the “corridor” have come closer). Ukraine’s maneuver mass has been more or less fully engaged, but is now holding its breath and regrouping and will soon (two-four weeks) be ready again, but in terms of materiel it has lost very few Western assets; Even ammunition doesn’t seem to be lacking at the moment, and morale is quite high thanks to the defensive successes at Avdiivka.

Time will tell whether the rainy period will be enough to recalculate and create the logistical reserves necessary to continue the counter-offensive as soon as the mud hardens. But unfortunately at this point I need to review the time horizon: I fear that the chances of the conflict ending by 2023 have dropped below 50 percent and are currently at 40 percent. However, Avdiivka provides us with a number of positive elements regarding the gradual attrition of Russian forces.

Russian counterattack at Avdiivka

As already mentioned, and unlike almost all previous ones, the Russian attack on Avdiivka was well planned. Fire, air and logistics support, as well as intelligence preparation and terrain selection, were professional.

However, it turned out that the forces used were completely unsuited to the task assigned to them: they were unable to act according to established procedures and have so far suffered very serious losses without achieving significant results. This should be attributed, first of all, to the nature of the forces used: almost exclusively old units were reconstituted with previously destroyed and mobilized personnel and various materials salvaged from warehouses or issued in new series by industry in an emergency, which the personnel did not know how to do. to use it correctly.

Given that the Avdiivka operation was clearly intended to be an important and possibly decisive operation (the Russians’ statements on Telegram confirm this), it seems significant that no elite forces were used to carry it out, confirming that they were literally “exhausted”. in counterattacks in the southern corridor. Even the apparent inability of the lower echelons (especially the company) to operate in the field confirms that the shortage of experienced low-ranking commanders (lieutenants and captains) is now at tragic levels, preventing the Russians from operating in the field as required. level.

In short: Russia’s Avdiivka offensive confirms to us that the wear and tear of the Russian army is at a critical level that prevents the development of effective offensive operations and allows only an all-out defense based on ever-increasing sacrifices. masses of people: a situation that is difficult to maintain over time and even more difficult to reverse, despite North Korea’s shipments of munitions and supplies.

The bottom line is this: Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive resulted in positive, if inconclusive, results; The Russian autumn seems doomed to complete failure; The Ukrainian winter should not pose any obstacle, and work to disintegrate the Russian army will certainly continue.

Meanwhile, of course, the Ukrainians’ systematic targeting of the Russian operational and theater infrastructure in the rear and especially in Crimea continues, while the support of the West (no matter what is discussed in the media or the squawking of pheasants) continues unchanged. and the arrival of Western planes is approaching.

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