Does the outcome of the vote in Taiwan pave the way for new tension scenarios between China and the USA? Considering the deteriorating relations in recent years, it is too early to understand in which direction the relations between the two superpowers will progress. However, the fall of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) into the hands of William Lai for the third consecutive year is already showing the first reactions from Beijing. For now, there are reactions at the diplomatic level, not the military.
Washington isn’t moving away from Taipei
Let’s go in order. Lai’s victory was followed by praise from the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, and a message from Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the Taiwanese for “demonstrating the strength of our democratic system.” China did not appreciate the words of Washington and other chanceries because they represented a violation of the “One China policy” because Taiwan would become an indispensable part of Chinese territory for Beijing.
Some analysts say that with Lai’s victory, Taiwan will continue to deepen its ties with the United States and other democracies. So much so that an American delegation, including former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, landed on the island, which boasts Washington’s military support, on January 14. It’s nothing new. Additionally, in 2000, 2008, and 2016, a group was sent immediately after the vote. However, this time the delegation has a higher profile than in the past. The visit should therefore be read not merely as a display of support for Lai, but as a request for approval to preserve the status quo.
And that’s certainly what will happen: Although Beijing describes him as a “dangerous separatist”, Lai has no intention of moving away from the rhetoric of outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, who has led the island for the past eight years. Therefore, the Democrat, who promises to work to preserve the fragile status quo, will maintain strong ties with the USA and try to establish a dialogue with China to normalize cross-strait relations. But he will have to manage the opposition of the People’s Republic of China, which immediately made it clear that it does not want to engage in dialogue with the DPP, and the flight of numerous countries that recognize the candidate.
The island of Nauru, one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, fell into Beijing’s arms by cutting ties with Taipei: This reduced the number of countries with which the island maintains official relations to 12. Given the non-random timing, there is a belief that this was a post-election “retaliation” so that China could still boast a diplomatic outcome.
Parliament’s difficult harmony
Not to mention political success. The vote on January 13 resulted in the split of the parliament. No party won a clear majority in the parliamentary elections (the first time this has happened since 2004), and in fact the pro-China Guomindang has one more seat than the DPP, which won 52 (out of 113 seats). has lost ten since the previous election. The tipping point will therefore be Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), with eight MPs. The new Parliament will take office in February – the president will be elected on the 1st – and Lai will find himself having to deal with a de facto divided Legislative Yuan. The DPP still hopes to make further social and economic progress after allowing Taiwan to become the first country in Asia to approve same-sex marriage and provide universal healthcare and affordable public transportation. But Lai now knows that the road is all uphill.
Approval of a bill to increase the defense budget (a measure seen as anti-China) is therefore in the hands of TPP MPs. It is not yet clear what party leader Ko, who has effectively become the decisive figure in Taiwanese politics, will do. He said during the election campaign that he was in favor of increasing military spending but was also leaning toward some kind of trade deal with China.
Not just the “China Factor”: What and how Taiwanese voters will vote
His very vague positions on many of the most important issues regarding the island of Taiwan could help or embarrass Lai’s government: if he decides to support the pro-China policies of the Guomindang, this agreement with Hou Yu will be implemented in parliament. Nuances emerged during the election campaign. Analysts agree that if the agreement between Taiwan People’s Party leaders and the Guomindang had been successful in the election race, Ko and Hou would have defeated Lai and won the election. It will be important to understand who will win in parliament: The approval of new reforms and the increase in the defense budget also depends on the role of TPP MPs.
Is there really a risk of war?
At this time, it seems unlikely that China will invade Taiwan or have an actual conflict. The reasons are economic and diplomatic. Let’s start with the second. According to some analysts, the People’s Republic of China is unlikely to take harsh actions after the meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden in November, tempered by its desire to maintain stable relations with Washington. Beijing will therefore try to find a balance between intimidation of Taipei and invitations to Washington to rein in Lai before Lai is inaugurated as president on May 20.
However, to keep the pressure on Taiwan high, China will conduct military exercises in areas near the island and impose targeted sanctions on some Taiwan products. However, there are no military signs for now. According to journalists Bloomberg EconomicsChina’s People’s Liberation Army is not massing troops on the country’s southern coast because of known problems in the army: Corruption among high military ranks makes it difficult for Xi to run a successful campaign.
Putting cannons and artillery aside for now, what would be the most likely war scenario? Beijing may resort to cyberattacks or blockade the island by sea to isolate it at a diplomatic and commercial level. But each of these scenarios would have severe economic consequences for everyone, not just Taiwan. Bloomberg EconomicsIn fact, the cost of isolation or war across the Taiwan Strait is estimated to be around 10 percent of global GDP, with economic consequences worse than those recorded for the Covid pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the global financial crisis of 2008. Taiwan will pay the highest price, but so will China and the United States, which are heavily dependent on Taiwanese technology and the semiconductor industry (Taiwan has maintained its lead for years, with 92 percent of global production of advanced microchips).
If Beijing truly wants to target Taipei with coercive economic measures, it should consider harming its interests and policies designed to turn China into a global superpower. Beijing is not quite ready for a war in the Taiwan Strait because of the social and economic difficulties it experiences inside and outside the Great Wall.
Source: Today IT
Karen Clayton is a seasoned journalist and author at The Nation Update, with a focus on world news and current events. She has a background in international relations, which gives her a deep understanding of the political, economic and social factors that shape the global landscape. She writes about a wide range of topics, including conflicts, political upheavals, and economic trends, as well as humanitarian crisis and human rights issues.
